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ANY OF US ENGAGE IN THE FAMILIAR PROCESS of mak-
ing resolutions, often at the start of a new year. We commit our-
selves to following certain courses of action that we very much 
want to achieve but expect may be difficult, such as procrastinating less or 
exercising more. In Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Richard Holton lays out a de-
tailed account of resolutions, arguing that they enable agents to resist tempta-
tion. Holton claims that temptation often leads to inappropriate shifts in 
judgment, and that resolutions are a special kind of first- and second-order 
intention pair that blocks such judgment shift. In this paper, I elaborate upon 
an intuitive but underdeveloped objection to Holton’s view – namely, that 
his view does not enable agents to successfully block the transmission of 
temptation in the way that he claims, because the second-order intention is as 
equally susceptible to temptation as the first-order intention alone would be. 
I appeal to independently compelling principles – principles that Holton 
should accept, because they help fill an important explanatory gap in his ac-
count – to demonstrate why this objection succeeds. This argument both 
shows us where Holton’s view goes wrong and points us to the kind of solu-
tion we need. In conclusion, I sketch an alternative account of resolutions as 
a first-order intention paired with a second-order desire; I argue that my ac-
count is not susceptible to the same objection because a temptation that can-
not be blocked by an intention can be blocked by a desire. 
1. Holton’s View of Resolutions
Although other philosophers have offered philosophical accounts of resolu-
tions, Holton’s account is the best developed and most influential.1 Holton 
1 For example, see McGuire (1961), who argues that you can decide to do something only if 
you know that you are able to do it, but can resolve to do something when you recognize that 
there is a chance of failure. McClennen (1990) outlines a notion of resolute choice in which the 
chooser commits herself to a plan that seems best at the time of initial choice, and then 
sticks with this plan regardless of whether it continues to seem best to her; his notion is 
elaborated upon and modified by Gauthier (1997). Cohen and Handfield (2010) argue that 
resolve is a distinct rational capacity to cease or suppress deliberation, and sketch a non-
consequentialist, virtue-based account of resolutions. 
It is a common idea among nonphilosophers that a resolution is a promise that you 
make to yourself. Several philosophers who defend the existence of promises to the self 
claim in passing that resolutions are a type of self-promise; for example, see Raz (1977: 210), 
Dannenberg (2015: 159), Habib (2009: 545n) and Rosati (2011: 124-25). However, the exist-
ence of genuine promises to the self is controversial. Some argue that self-promises do not 
exist because we have no moral obligations to ourselves at all; see Singer (1959). Others ar-
gue that we can have moral obligations to the self, but that the possibility of promisee release 
M 
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understands resolutions as a special type of intention. He builds on Michael 
Bratman’s (1987) prominent account of intention, according to which inten-
tions are non-reducible mental states that aid in inter- and intrapersonal 
planning and coordination. Typically, intentions are effective at bringing 
agents to act. 
Sometimes, though, temptations of various sorts threaten to sway an 
agent from her intended course of action. Holton argues that temptation 
“frequently works not simply by overcoming one’s better judgement, but by 
corrupting one’s judgement,” noting that “as a matter of empirical fact, tempta-
tion normally induces judgment shift” (97). In other words, an agent who 
succumbs to the temptation to smoke another cigarette in spite of an inten-
tion not to do so does not typically maintain her judgment that she ought not 
smoke while akratically lighting up anyway. Rather, in many cases her judg-
ment about smoking shifts; she changes her mind about whether to smoke, 
making smoking in line with her current judgment about what is best. 
Holton argues that this sort of judgment shift leads to an agent’s judg-
ment becoming “either corrupted or powerless” in such a way that it “cannot 
be the motor of resistance” to temptation (98). He proposes that what can 
function as the source of resistance in such cases is a resolution, cashed out as 
a pair of intentions, one first order and the other second order. Resolutions 
consist in “both an intention to engage in a certain action, and a further in-
tention not to let that intention be deflected” (11). So an agent who resolves to 
quit smoking both intends not to have any more cigarettes and intends not to 
reconsider the intention not to have any more cigarettes. This second-order 
intention prevents judgment shift. For if the agent does not allow herself to 
reconsider whether she should hang on to her intention to avoid cigarettes, 
her judgment will not have the opportunity to shift, and she will be likely to 
act as she originally intended. 
An important and insufficiently appreciated insight in Holton’s account 
is that temptation leads to judgment shift not merely through some brute 
causal process. Rather, a mental process is involved that, while not fully ra-
tional, allows the agent who succumbs to temptation to make sense of her 
action; as a term of art, I call this a sense-making process. Holton suggests that 
one major cause of judgment shift is that agents typically foresee that they are 
likely to succumb to temptation. They want to see themselves in a good light, 
and avoid the cognitive dissonance of believing that it would be best to re-
frain from Φing while believing that they will Φ anyway. An easy way to re-
solve this dissonance is by changing the belief that it would be best to refrain 
from Φing. This method of resolving cognitive dissonance by shifting judg-
ment is not rational, but it at least allows the agent to make sense of her own 
action.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
makes promissory obligations to the self implausible; for example, see Hills (2003) and 
Liberman (unpublished manuscript). 
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However, more needs to be said. Holton’s appeal to the avoidance of 
cognitive dissonance leaves unanswered the more fundamental question of 
why agents predict that they will succumb to temptation in the first place. 
Why are we likely to act as we are tempted to, even when we have explicitly 
intended not to so act? This question is independently interesting; temptation 
is a frequent and frustrating part of our everyday experience, and we want a 
complete philosophical understanding of how temptation works. But the 
question is of particular importance for Holton, for the answer will help ex-
plain why temptation leads agents to revise their first-order intentions in the 
first place, and Holton’s account of resolutions is motivated by the need to 
prevent such revision. I return to this question in Section 4.2 
 
2. The Efficacy Objection  
 
One might wonder why adding a second-order intention makes any differ-
ence for preventing judgment shift. We can call this the efficacy objection: why is 
a resolution more effective at resisting temptation than a first-order intention 
alone would be? Holton’s answer is an appeal to willpower as the means by 
which agents resist temptation and achieve strength of will. For Holton, will-
power is “substantial; it is at least a skill and perhaps a self-standing faculty, 
the exercise of which causally explains our ability to stick to a resolution” 
(112). Exerting willpower requires effort. Like other faculties, willpower can 
be built up by exercise or depleted by overuse. 
But even if we granted that agents possess some faculty of willpower 
and we perfectly understood how this faculty works, a worry about efficacy 
would remain. Sarah Paul characterizes Holtonian temptation as “essentially 
involv[ing] the tantalizing action’s petitioning of one’s awareness with a prac-
tical proposal” (2011: 891). She argues that this seems to be a problem for 
Holton, for “surely this already suffices for the practical question to be 
raised” (891). And once the practical question is raised, the answer is obvi-
ous, for “once temptation has set in, of course the pleasure afforded by [for 
example] the wine outweighs all other considerations. Revision will be well-
nigh automatic (891).” Paul goes on to suggest that, because temptation pre-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I am presuming in this discussion that diachronic norms of rationality govern our resolu-
tions, such that something goes wrong with you if you abandon your resolution without 
good reason. There is currently a live philosophical debate about whether irreducibly dia-
chronic norms of (epistemic and/or practical) rationality exist (for example, see Christensen 
2000, Ferrero 2012, Hedden 2015 and Moss 2015 for arguments that no such norms exist, 
and Bratman 1987, Holton 2009, Broome 2013, Hlobil 2015 and Carr 2016 for arguments 
that they do). However, I do not need to delve into this debate for present purposes, since 
one could translate Holton’s (and my) claims about the stability of resolutions into a “time-
slice rationality” framework that denies the existence of irreducible diachronic norms of 
practical rationality. For example, Hedden proposes that the stability of intentions is a causal 
fact, and that “if you have background evidence that you typically are rational in what inten-
tions you form, and reconsidering intentions often stems from temptation, it will be rational 
not to re-open deliberation unless you have strong evidence that this case is different” (126). 
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sents the alternative action so vividly, it will push for revision of not only the 
first-order intention but also the entire resolution.  
In other words, it seems that the second-order intention should suc-
cumb to the same temptation to which the first-order intention is susceptible. 
John Maier (2010) articulates this worry as follows: 
 
For any considerations in favor of revising one’s first-order intention would pre-
sumably also be grounds for revising one’s second-order intention to not let that intention be de-
flected. But then it does not seem that a higher-order intention of this sort will be 
guaranteed to be any more rationally robust than a first-order intention – it is, as it 
were, just another intention (my emphasis; 361). 
 
It might seem that not even willpower can prevent the transmission of temp-
tation from the first-order intention to the second-order intention. Why do 
the very same considerations that tempt you toward watching yet another 
episode of your favorite TV show – say, your burning desire to find out what 
happens next, and your aversion to working – not also tempt you to recon-
sider your resolution to turn off the TV and get to work on your paper, re-
gardless of whether you possess willpower? 
Something is intuitively compelling about this objection; philosophers 
before me have noticed it, and it seems prima facie plausible. But as of yet, 
the objection is underdeveloped. For we have not seen why the temptation 
that pushes on the first-order intention pushes on the second-order intention 
as well. What causes the temptation to transmit in this way? I will answer that 
question in the next two sections of this paper, thereby making what was 
previously merely an intuitive objection more rigorous. In doing so, I will fill 
in the explanatory gap mentioned at the end of Section 1, above, and explain 
why agents are likely to abandon their first-order intentions in light of temp-
tation. 
When thinking about how to precisify the efficacy objection, it is im-
portant to realize that the first- and second-order intentions involved in a 
resolution are about different things: one is an intention to Φ, and the other is 
an intention to refrain from reconsidering the intention to Φ. We cannot simply 
assume that a temptation to refrain from Φing will also be a temptation to 
reconsider an intention to Φ. For, at least in principle, these two different 
intentions could be susceptible to entirely different temptations. And if this 
were so, a temptation that leads to judgment shift at the first-order level 
would not automatically lead to judgment shift at the second-order level as 
well. 
Rather, I will construct a Temptation Transmission argument to show that a 
temptation to abandon a first-order intention will automatically also yield an 
equally strong temptation to abandon any second-order intention about 
maintaining that first-order intention. The argument relies on certain back-
ground principles, which I lay out in the Section 3 before constructing the 
argument in Section 4. The first stage of Temptation Transmission explains why 
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the tempted agent feels pressure to act contrary to her first-order intention in 
the first place, thereby answering the general question about temptation 
posed at the end of Section 1. Holton must accept an explanation like this 
one in order to motivate his account. But the second stage of the argument 
entails that any temptation that puts pressure on an agent’s first-order inten-
tion necessarily also puts pressure on her second-order intention – which 
means that the second-order intention will not reliably block the very tempta-
tion it was designed to circumvent, and the resolution will be no more effec-
tive at preventing judgment shift than a first-order intention alone would be. 
Since both stages of the argument employ similar reasoning and draw on the 
same plausible principles, Holton cannot easily resist the second stage with-
out also rejecting the first. And Holton has good reason to accept the first, as 
it fills in a gap in his account. 
 
3. Background Principles for the Temptation Transmission Argument 
 
3.1. Temptation Claim 
 
The starting point for Temptation Transmission is the following empirical claim: 
 
Temptation Claim: Temptation works by altering the appearances in favor of 
there being a reason to do the tempting thing, from the agent’s perspective. 
 
Temptation Claim is a general formulation of the empirical understanding of 
temptation to which Holton is committed. Holton claims that what causes 
people to yield to temptation is desire in a certain sense. The sense of desire 
he has in mind is very like Scanlon’s (1998) concept of desire in the directed-
attention sense, according to which a “person’s attention is directed insistently 
toward considerations that present themselves as counting in favor of” the 
desired object or action (Holton 2009: 39). Assuming (as Scanlon does) that a 
reason for X is a consideration that counts in favor of X, desire in this sense 
directs the agent’s attention toward apparent reasons for X. Since temptation 
leads to desire in this sense, temptation draws the agent’s attention to appar-
ent reasons for the tempting thing.3 
Temptation Claim captures the phenomenology of temptation well. 
Sometimes temptation clues the agent in to genuine reasons that she has to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Holton notes that the features of desire that Scanlon points out “may be necessary for de-
sire to arise; but they do not constitute it” (102). He suggests that “what is missing in 
Scanlon’s characterization is the idea that desire pulls me to a certain course of action,” con-
cluding that the sense of desire he is after “is a state that preoccupies an agent’s attention 
with an urge to perform a certain action” (102). Temptation Claim makes sense of this: the 
agent’s attention is directed toward an apparent reason, and the apparent reason is what cre-
ates the urge to act. Since agents (typically) act for reasons, this is a natural picture. And if we 
did not cash out the urge in terms of reasons, it is unclear what else could be motivating or 
driving the agent. 
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do the tempting thing; an agent who is tempted to abandon her resolution to 
go to the gym at 7 a.m. because she feels extremely sleepy when her alarm 
goes off really does have a reason to sleep in, albeit likely a weaker reason 
than the reason to go as planned. In such a case, the temptation might make 
the reasons to stay in bed seem stronger to the sleepy agent than she takes 
them to be upon reflection, when not being tempted. 
But temptation can also make it seem to the agent like there is a reason 
for her to do the tempting thing when by her own lights she has none. For 
example, consider a recovering alcoholic who is committed to maintaining 
his sobriety. He is feeling tempted by a bottle of whiskey. He does not take 
himself to actually have a reason to drink. Rather, he takes himself to have 
strong reasons not to. But in the moment of temptation, it nevertheless seems 
to him as if he has a reason to drink. The appearances of what he has reason 
to do have altered, even though his actual reasons have not. 
Moreover, it seems likely that agents who foresee the need to form a 
resolution in anticipation of a certain temptation also foresee that the tempta-
tion might alter the appearances in favor of there being a reason for them to 
do the tempting thing. For if the temptation did not seem to provide them 
with reasons, then they would not have needed to form resolutions in the 
first place; merely intending to act would have sufficed. A temptation that is 
serious enough to motivate an agent to form a resolution will seem to pre-
sent that agent with reasons for acting. 
 
3.2. Rational Means Reasons Transmission 
 
Temptation Transmission relies in large part on the philosophically common-
place and highly intuitive observation that reasons for ends transmit to the 
necessary means to those ends.4 In particular, I rely on a subjective version of 
the principle, which concerns not what reasons there are, but what reasons a 
rational agent will take there to be. The transmission principle I rely on is 
also broader than most, in a way that will play an important role in the argu-
ments to come: 
 
Rational-Means Reasons Transmission (RMRT): Where E is an intentional ac-
tion, if it appears to a rational agent A that (1) there is a reason of strength X for an 
agent A to attain end E, and (2) M is the only rationally permissible way to attain E, 
then there will appear to A to be a reason of strength X for A to do M. 
 
RMRT states that when a rational agent takes herself to have a reason to take 
some end – say, a reason to travel from L.A. to New York for a long week-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Versions of a necessary-means reasons-transmission principle have been formulated and 
defended in slightly different ways by Nagel (1970: 34), Darwall (1970: 16), Kolodny (2007: 
251), Schroeder (2009: 245), Bratman (2009: 424) and Way (2012: 494), among others, none 
of whom formulate the principle in the way I do here. 
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end – then she will also take herself to have an equally strong reason to take 
whatever means are necessary for attaining that end in a rationally permissi-
ble way – say, buying a plane ticket. Several special features of this principle 
are worth highlighting. First, RMRT includes a commonly accepted con-
straint that the strength of the reason transmitted from end to means remains 
constant, such that an apparent reason of strength X for the end yields an 
apparent reason of strength X for the sole rationally permissible means.5 
Second, RMRT allows reasons to transmit in a broader range of cases 
than do typical necessary-means reasons-transmission principles. Under 
RMRT, a means counts as necessary for the purposes of reasons transmission if 
the means is the only rationally permissible option. Buying a plane ticket is 
not strictly necessary to get from L.A. to New York for a long weekend – you 
could drive, or board the plane with a stolen or counterfeit ticket. But neither 
of these other options makes any sense; driving takes far too long to make a 
weekend trip worthwhile, and flying with a stolen or counterfeit ticket is far 
too difficult and risky. RMRT is broader than standard means-end transmis-
sion principles, which state that reasons transmit from end to means only if 
the means is strictly necessary. But RMRT is not overly broad, for it restricts 
the reasons transmission to the sole rationally permissible way to attain an 
end. For example, suppose you have a reason of strength X to pay for an 
item at the store. You can pay with cash, credit card or check. Your credit 
card is maxed out, leaving paying with cash or check as rationally permissible 
options for you. RMRT does not predict that you have a reason of strength 
X to pay by check and a reason of strength X to pay with cash. Rather, 
RMRT strikes a balance between being more permissive than necessary-means 
reasons-transmission principles, but less permissive than sufficient-means rea-
sons-transmission principles.6 
Third, unlike most reasons-transmission principles, RMRT is concerned 
not with what (objective) reasons there are, but with what (subjective) rea-
sons agents take there to be. I have already argued that temptation provides 
agents not necessarily with actual reasons to act, but with the appearance of rea-
sons to act. It follows that if we are to employ RMRT in the Temptation 
Transmission argument, RMRT must apply to the transmission of the appear-
ance of reasons. Accordingly, RMRT tells us that if agents are rational, rea-
sons will appear to them to transmit from means to sole permissible end.7 For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Kolodny (forthcoming) argues that reasons will not always transmit full strength to neces-
sary means. But his counterexample cases turn on features that do not matter for the ways in 
which I will be applying RMRT. So while this complication is important for a general ac-
count of reasons transmission, I may gloss over it here without problem. 
6 For arguments that reasons transmit to sufficient means as well as necessary means, see 
Bedke (2009: 687n) and Way (2010: 224). For a detailed discussion of whether means-end 
reasons-transmission principles should be necessary or sufficient, see Kolodny (forthcom-
ing), who concludes that the means must be non-superfluous, which rules out merely suffi-
cient means. 
7 My claim here is narrow, and concerns only whether an apparent reason to attain an end 
transmits to the means necessary for rationally attaining that end. The truth of this claim has 
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RMRT to apply, the agent in question need not be a rationally perfect agent; 
few (if any) of us can meet that demanding criterion. Rather, RMRT will hold 
if the agent is rational with regard to the means-end reasoning process in 
which she is engaged. That is, RMRT will apply to agents who are capable 
means-end reasoners – even if they have not perfectly proportioned all of 
their credences to their evidence, or if they hold one pair of incompatible 
beliefs, or if they fail to be perfectly rational in some other way. As I will ar-
gue in the next section, Temptation Transmission applies to agents involved in a 
sense-making process regarding their own behavior, including their own 
means-end reasoning. In order to participate in such a process, agents must 
be minimally capable means-end reasoners, as required by RMRT. 
To highlight the independent plausibility of RMRT, consider a series of 
examples. First, suppose a just country requires all of its citizens to either join 
the military for two years or perform alternative service. Smith correctly takes 
herself to have a reason to satisfy this legal requirement. Because Smith is a 
principled and committed pacifist, joining the military is rationally impermis-
sible for her. Accordingly, the only rationally permissible way for Smith to 
attain the end of satisfying her legal requirement is by performing alternative 
service. It follows that, so long as she is a capable means-end reasoner, Smith 
will take herself to have a reason to perform alternative service.8 Second, 
suppose that Smith’s country is unjust, and that she does not in fact have 
good reason to obey her country’s laws – or, suppose that she has good rea-
son to obey the law, but that performing alternative service is not in fact the 
only rationally permissible way for her to do so (say, because she mistakenly 
believes that her religion commits her to pacifism when in fact it commands 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
no impact on broader debates in epistemology about whether all of our reasons are always 
apparent to us, or whether all of our mental states are luminous (i.e., such that we are always 
in a position to know what they are). The transmission of apparent reasons from end to 
means is compatible with the existence of (subjective or objective) reasons that are not ap-
parent. 
8 The case of pacifist Smith choosing between joining the military or performing alternative 
service has been discussed by Horty (1993: 73), Goble (2004: 80) and Nair (2014: 2). Follow-
ing Horty, these authors all formulate the example as an instance of a pattern of good or 
valid reasoning involving disjunction: if you have reason to do A vs. B, and you have reason 
not to do A, then you can conclude that you have reason to do B. RMRT as formulated re-
stricts reasons transmission only to means. But the principle could instead be formulated as 
an instance of the following broader disjunctive principle – call it Disjunctive Reasons 
Transmission (DRT): if (1) you take yourself to have a reason of strength X to do (A vs. B), 
and (2) you take A to be rationally impermissible, then (C) if you are rational, you will take 
yourself to have a reason of strength X to do B. 
The objective version of DRT faces a worry about reasons explosion: if it is possible 
for there to be a reason to do A and for A to be rationally impermissible, we can generate 
that you have a reason to do B, for any B. The same worry will apply to the subjective ver-
sion of DRT if it is possible for an agent to rationally take there to be a reason for her to do 
A, and for her to rationally take A to be rationally impermissible. However, even if this is 
possible, I avoid explosion by restricting DRT to range only over means, thereby preventing 
any B from being included in the disjunction. 
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her to fight in just wars). Nevertheless, if it seems to Smith that she has good 
reason to obey the laws of her country, and it seems to her that the only ration-
ally permissible way to do so is performing alternative service, then (assum-
ing Smith is a capable means-end reasoner) it will also seem to her that she has 
a good reason to serve.  
Similarly, suppose a recovering alcoholic is clear-sighted enough to rec-
ognize that he does not really have a good reason to drink whiskey. But the 
tempting scotch in front of him makes it appear to him that he does. If he 
believes that opening the bottle is the only rationally permissible way for him 
to have a glass of scotch, it will also seem to him that he has a good reason to 
open the bottle. It is not clear how we would explain this if we denied that 
RMRT applied to the appearance of reasons. These cases show us that the 
appearance of reasons transmits from end to sole permissible means in ra-
tional agents, even if the agent is mistaken about what reasons there in fact 
are. 
Temptation Transmission starts with Temptation Claim, and then applies 
RMRT to a series of independently compelling claims about which mental 
states are the only rationally permissible means to rationally holding other 
mental states. Agents who follow the steps laid out in Temptation Transmission, 
while not fully rational, engage in a sense-making process that enables them 
to see themselves in a good light. As we shall see in the next section, the ar-
gument concludes that temptation necessarily transmits – not only to first-
order intentions, as Holton claims it does, but to resolute second-order inten-
tions as well. Moreover, seeing the exact way in which temptation transmits 
will show us what sort of view we need to stop the transmission. 
 
4. The Temptation Transmission Argument 
 
The following three claims form the basis of Temptation Transmission:  
 
1) When Φing is an action about which an agent has formed a resolution, an ap-
parent reason to Φ (stemming from temptation) necessarily leads to an appar-
ent reason to intend to Φ. 
 
2) An apparent reason to intend to Φ necessarily leads to an apparent reason to 
reconsider the intention to avoid Φing (call this intention “Intention 1”). 
 
3) An apparent reason to reconsider Intention 1 necessarily leads to an apparent 
reason to reconsider the intention not to reconsider Intention 1 (call this inten-
tion “Intention 2”). 
 
If these three claims are true, Holton’s account of resolutions is in trouble, 
for Intention 2 will not successfully block temptation and prevent reconsid-
eration after all. The first two claims by themselves are not problematic for 
Holton. To the contrary, Holton’s argument needs claims of this sort: they 
answer the question from Section 1, and explain why temptation is likely to 
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lead to judgment shift and abandonment of the first-order intention in the 
first place, such that we need something additional to prevent such shift and 
abandonment. The third claim is what puts pressure on Holton’s account – 
but, as we shall see, this claim is difficult to resist while accepting the first 
two, as it invokes similar reasoning and draws on principles that Holton ac-
cepts. 
The three claims above can be defended by appealing to RMRT and to 
the relationships between means and rationally permissible ends among vari-
ous sorts of mental states. I will work through these claims one at a time, be-
fore putting the entire argument together. (While I lay out my discussion in 
terms of intending to Φ in spite of a resolution to avoid Φing – e.g., resolv-
ing to avoid eating sweets and being tempted to eat a donut – we could just 
as easily cash things out in terms of a positive resolution and a temptation to 
do something else – e.g., resolving to eat only healthy food and being tempt-
ed to eat a donut.) 
 
4.1. Defending Claim 1 
 
The empirical claim about temptation states that a temptation to eat a donut 
makes it seem to the agent like she has a reason to eat the donut. RMRT 
states that reasons transfer from ends to sole, rationally permissible, suffi-
cient means. If it appears to the agent that intending to violate her resolution 
by eating a donut is the only rationally permissible way to do so, we will have 
established Claim 1: that an apparent reason to abandon one’s resolution by 
eating the donut will always lead to an apparent reason to intend to eat the do-
nut as well. 
Surely intending to Φ is not always necessary for Φing; many of our ac-
tions are unintentional. Nor is it always the case that intending to Φ is neces-
sary for rationally Φing; habitual actions such as using a turn signal while driv-
ing can be rationally performed unintentionally. But it makes sense to form 
resolutions only about actions that are in your direct intentional control; if 
you know that you will automatically reach out to deflect a ball that is thrown 
at you, it is silly for you to resolve not to deflect it, and superfluous for you 
to resolve to deflect it. Claim 1 states that when Φing is an action that is in 
your intentional control, intending to refrain from Φing is the only rationally 
permissible way to refrain from Φing. In other words, you can rationally fail to 
satisfy a resolution only if you do so intentionally. 
Certainly, it is possible to eat the donut and fail to satisfy your resolution 
without intending to do so. We often fail to keep our resolutions in spite of 
ourselves by acting mindlessly and not forming any intentions about what we 
do, or by acting akratically in a way that is contrary to our intentions. But 
these ways of failing to keep a resolution are not rational. To fail to keep your 
resolution in a way that allows you to make sense of your own behavior, you 
must choose to abandon the resolution; that is, you must do so on purpose, 
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or intentionally. Mindless or akratic behavior does not enable you to tell a 
coherent story about your own actions in the way that intentional behavior 
does.  
To illustrate with another example: an agent who resolves not to watch 
yet another episode of her favorite show might let the next episode play be-
cause of apathy or mindlessness. But if she is to watch another episode in a 
way that allows her to make rational sense of her own actions, she must intend 
to let another episode play. Temptation makes it seem to the agent like there 
is a reason to watch another episode. It also seems to the agent that intending 
to watch another episode is the only rationally permissible way for her to give 
up on her resolution and watch the next episode, because this is the only way 
she can make sense of her own behavior. And so, by RMRT, there will ap-
pear to the agent to be a reason to intend to watch another episode.  
 
4.2. Defending Claim 2 
 
Claim 2 states that an apparent reason to intend to Φ necessarily leads to an 
apparent reason to reconsider the intention to avoid Φing. The argument for 
this claim proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that rational agents will believe 
that giving up any intention that you have not to Φ is the only rationally 
permissible way to intend to Φ. By RMRT, an apparent reason to intend to 
Φ will therefore lead to an apparent reason to abandon the intention not to 
Φ. Second, I argue that rational agents will also believe that reconsidering an 
intention is the only rationally permissible way to abandon it. And so again, 
by RMRT, an apparent reason to abandon the intention not to Φ will there-
fore lead to an apparent reason to reconsider that intention. 
The first means-end claim is true because of the following commonly 
accepted and intuitively obvious constraint on intentions: 
 
Intention Consistency Constraint: It is not rational for an agent to intend to Φ at 
time t and to simultaneously intend not to Φ at time t.9 
 
When intentions work properly, they bring agents to action in accordance 
with them. Since it is not possible to simultaneously eat a donut and not eat a 
donut, it does not make sense to simultaneously intend to do both of these 
things. An agent who simultaneously intends to eat a donut and intends not 
to eat a donut must therefore abandon at least one of these intentions if she 
is to be rational. It follows from this that giving up any intention to avoid 
eating a donut is the only rationally permissible means to intending to eat the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Philosophers ground this constraint differently; for example, cognitivists about intention 
(such as Gilbert Harman and David Velleman) offer different explanations than those who 
endorse planning theories of intention, like Bratman. But there is a general consensus that 
some such consistency constraint exists. See Bratman (2009a) for a detailed discussion of 
this. 
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donut – and agents who are capable means-end reasoners will recognize this. 
Giving up the intention to avoid the donut might not be something that the 
agent must do in order to intend to eat the donut at all; it might be possible 
to hold conflicting intentions. But since it is not possible to rationally do so, 
we can apply RMRT to conclude that a reason to intend to Φ yields an equal-
ly good reason to abandon the intention not to Φ. 
The second means-end claim states that capable means-end reasoners 
will believe that agents cannot rationally revise or abandon intentions unless 
they first reconsider those intentions. This is true to our everyday experience. 
Suppose that, when I wake up, I intend to go to a yoga class at 8 p.m. But I 
procrastinate all day, and do not finish the work that I hoped to complete. It 
would not be rational for me to go immediately from being in this state to be-
ing in the state of abandoning my intention to go to yoga. To the contrary, I 
have to think about the new state of affairs, temporarily shelving the inten-
tion to go to yoga and deliberating anew about what to do. Do I go to yoga 
as planned and not get any work done today? Or do I skip yoga to do work? 
If I did not go through some sort of deliberative process like this, my revi-
sion would be entirely out of the blue. If I am lucky, this revision will be in 
accordance with the rational course of action. But since I will not always be 
lucky, this is not a rational disposition to have in general. In general, some 
sort of reconsideration must always occur, lest agents revise inappropriately. 
Reconsideration of an intention need not be a long or drawn-out pro-
cess, and it need not involve difficult deliberation. If I intend to bake a cake, 
and my oven catches fire while it is preheating, I need not deliberate about 
whether to attempt to bake a cake in the flaming oven; I can decide immedi-
ately that baking a cake no longer makes sense. But I will go through some 
process of revision, even if very quick. One might worry that it is possible to 
rationally abandon an intention without first reconsidering it. Sometimes our 
intentions simply disappear or fall away; for example, you might intend to go 
to a concert at the end of the week and forget about it before the day arrives, 
without any irrationality. But when we are dealing with an intention about 
which you have made a resolution, this is not the case. If you resolve to go to 
the concert at the end of the week, something does go wrong if you simply 
forget about it. So we can apply RMRT to conclude that a reason to abandon 
the intention to Φ leads to a reason to reconsider the intention to Φ. 
So far, Temptation Transmission has explained why a temptation to Φ nec-
essarily leads, via a sense-making process, to the appearance of a reason to 
reconsider the intention not to Φ. This answers the question from Section 1 
about why agents predict that they will be likely succumb to temptation. 
When an agent intends not to Φ and is tempted to Φ, there appears to her to 
be a reason to abandon her intention. She predicts that she will succumb to 
temptation because she predicts that she will respond to this apparent reason. 
Temptation Transmission starts with an account of temptation that Holton ac-
cepts, and then relies on plausible and widely accepted general principles to 
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establish an explanation of the sort Holton needs to motivate his account of 
resolutions. Up until this point, then, Holton should be sympathetic to Temp-
tation Transmission. 
 
4.3. Defending Claim 3 
 
The core of the defense of Claim 3 is the claim that rationally reconsidering 
an intention not to Φ (what I will call Intention 1) requires abandoning the 
second-order intention not to reconsider that intention (what I will call In-
tention 2). From this claim, we apply RMRT to establish that an apparent 
reason to reconsider Intention 1 will always lead to an apparent reason to 
abandon Intention 2. As we saw in Section 4.2, abandoning an intention in a 
rationally permissible way requires first reconsidering it. This will establish 
Claim 3: that an apparent reason to reconsider Intention 1 necessarily leads 
to an apparent reason to reconsider Intention 2.  
Why should capable means-end reasoners believe that the only way to 
rationally abandon Intention 1 is to reconsider the second-order intention 
not to reconsider Intention 1? We can best answer this question by thinking 
about what it would be like for an agent to reconsider an intention without 
first giving up her intention not to do so. Suppose that I intend not to eat 
any dairy products, and I intend not to reconsider this intention. As I am 
grocery shopping, I see that my favorite cheese is on sale. While actively 
maintaining my second-order intention not to reconsider whether to intend 
to avoid dairy, I go ahead and reconsider anyway. That is, even though I in-
tend not to reconsider the intention to avoid dairy, I begin questioning 
whether I really want to maintain this intention after all. 
Such a state seems rationally impermissible, and with good reason – for 
it is an example of a paradigmatic sort of akratic irrationality. Akrasia can 
happen at two stages.10 First, and most frequently discussed, there can be an 
akratic break between what an agent judges best and what she intends to do. 
Second, there can be an akratic break between what an agent intends to do 
and what she actually does.11 If I intend not to have a second glass of wine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Tappolet (2013) for a helpful taxonomy of philosophical views on weakness of will 
and akrasia. Rorty (1980) notes that an akratic break can occur at multiple places, including 
between the formation of an intention and action. Wiggins (1978) argues that weakness of 
will has to do with failing to persist with one’s intentions. Mele (1987) treats acting against 
one’s intentions as one form of weakness of will, cashing it out as a special case of acting 
against one’s best judgment. 
11 Holton uses “akrasia” in a narrow sense to refer only to judging that Φing is best, and then 
failing to intend to Φ. What I am calling second-stage akrasia will not always count as akratic 
in Holton’s narrow sense, for it might not involve going against your best judgment: you 
might judge that Φing is best, and then intend to   and fail to do so. However, it does not 
matter whether we refer to this gap between intention and action as akratic. What matters is 
whether a gap like this is problematic, and (as I shall argue below) Holton seems to presume 
that it is. 
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with dinner but I do so anyway, I am irrational by my own lights, for I am 
not successfully carrying out my own plans. When I intend not to reconsider 
my intention to avoid dairy but then reconsider this intention anyway, I am 
akratic in precisely the way that I am when I intend not to have a second 
glass of wine but then have one anyway.12 
If I am to reconsider my intention to avoid dairy without being guilty of 
akratic irrationality, I must first abandon any intention I have to avoid engag-
ing in such reconsideration, just as I would have to abandon my intention to 
refrain from a second glass of wine in order to rationally indulge in another 
glass. And as we saw in the previous section, rationally abandoning an inten-
tion requires reconsidering that intention. This shows us that rationally re-
considering the intention not to Φ requires reconsidering the second-order 
intention not to engage in such reconsideration.  
It would be very difficult for Holton to reject this appeal to anti-akrasia 
norms, because such norms form an important part of his own argument. 
Recall that Holton claims that a major cause of judgment shift is that agents 
foresee that they are likely to succumb to temptation, and want to avoid the 
cognitive dissonance of believing that it would be best to refrain from Φing 
while believing that they will Φ anyway. The fact that agents feel dissonance 
when they predict that they will Φ while intending not to is evidence that 
they recognize that something is irrational about being in this state. Were it 
rationally permissible to intend to Φ and not act on that intention, agents 
would not feel any cognitive dissonance. If they did not feel dissonance, they 
would not feel pressure to shift their judgments, and we would not need res-
olutions to block such shift. 
For ease of reference, I summarize the Temptation Transmission argument 
in the following table; recall that Intention 1 refers to the agent’s intention to 
avoid Φing, while Intention 2 refers to the agent’s second-order intention not 
to abandon Intention 1. 
 
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Some important qualifications are necessary for a proper understanding of the general 
norm forbidding akrasia between what an agent intends to do and what she actually does. 
We do not want to predict that an agent who intends to Φ at time t+1 is akratic because she 
fails to Φ at some earlier time t. So the proper formulation of the general norm will have to 
include some reference to tense, or perhaps be formulated as a synchronic rather than dia-
chronic norm. Nor do we want to predict that an agent who intends to Φ but is prevented 
from Φing by entirely external circumstances is guilty of akratic irrationality, which means 
that the general norm will have to be formulated so as to rule out such cases. Hammering 
out this general formulation is beyond my present scope. However, we need not worry about 
ruling out external circumstances for my present purposes. I employ the intention/action 
anti-akrasia norm with regard only to higher-order mental states: the agent intends not to 
reconsider her intention, and then reconsiders that intention anyway. Such higher-order 
mental states are internal, and – at least barring the interference of nefarious neuroscientists 
– are therefore in the agent’s control. 
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 First stage Transmission Second stage Why? 
1 Temptation to Φ 
Necessarily leads 
to … 
Appearance of a 
reason to Φ Empirical claim 
2 
Appearance of a 
reason to Φ 
Necessarily leads 
to … 
Appearance of a 
reason to intend 
to Φ 
Intentional action 
requires an intention 
3 
Appearance of a 




Appearance of a 





Appearance of a 




Appearance of a 
reason to recon-





Appearance of a 
reason to recon-
sider Intention 1 
Necessarily leads 
to … 
Appearance of a 
reason to give up 
Intention 2 Anti-akrasia norm 
6 
Appearance of a 




Appearance of a 
reason to recon-





The first four stages of the argument answer an independently important 
question about how temptation leads via a sense-making process to the ap-
pearance of a reason to abandon one’s first-order intention. This is a claim 
that Holton can accept. The last two stages, boxed in black, draw on an anti-
akrasia norm that Holton in fact accepts to form an argument that Holton 
cannot accept: that temptation leads via a sense-making process to the ap-
pearance of a reason to abandon one’s second-order intention as well. The 
efficacy objection is now back in force: since the temptation to Φ leads to the 
appearance of an equally strong reason to abandon the first-order intention to 
Φ and to abandon the resolute second-order intention, the second-order in-
tention cannot do any meaningful work in blocking temptation and prevent-
ing judgment shift. 
 
5. Blocking the Efficacy Objection Another Way? 
 
It is important to note the limits of Temptation Transmission. I am not claiming 
that agents who have formed Holtonian resolutions will never be able to resist 
temptation and prevent judgment shift. I am simply claiming that the method 
of resistance that Holton proposes – a second-order intention, specifically 
aimed at preventing reconsideration of the first-order intention – is suscepti-
ble to the very same pressure that it was designed to resist and is therefore 
unreliable. This is compatible with the claim that, in certain cases, agents will 
have other sources of resistance that enable them to avoid reconsidering the 
second-order intention and thereby prevent inappropriate judgment shift. 
Holton’s argument will still be in trouble if such other means of resistance 
are sometimes possible on a case-by-case basis, so long as no means of re-
sistance bolsters second-order intentions across the board. 
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What might such a broad boost to our second-order intentions consist 
in? I have argued that a temptation that pushes with strength X on Intention 
1 will also push with strength X on Intention 2, such that, all else being 
equal, Intention 2 will be no more effective at resisting judgment shift than 
Intention 1 alone would be. But if all else is not equal, there might be general, 
independent reasons for the agent to maintain Intention 2 that do not also 
apply to Intention 1. This defense requires that these reasons to maintain In-
tention 2 are not ipso facto also reasons to maintain Intention 1, lest Inten-
tions 1 and 2 be equally well supported, and therefore equally susceptible to 
judgment shift. Are there any such reasons? 
These reasons would have to be apparent to the agent, for reasons to 
maintain Intention 2 that the agent does not know about will not help the 
agent maintain Intention 2. What apparent reasons might an agent have for 
maintaining an intention to avoid reconsidering another intention? One an-
swer is whatever reasons she has for holding that other intention in the first 
place. That smoking is unhealthy is a strong reason to intend to quit smok-
ing. The unhealthiness of smoking seems to be an equally strong reason not 
to reconsider the intention to quit. But this strategy of deriving the reasons 
for Intention 2 from the reasons for Intention 1 will not help, for the reasons 
supporting Intention 2 would be of the same strength and type as the reasons 
supporting Intention 1, making the two intentions equally well supported. 
The reasons for Intention 2 cannot be so general that they necessarily sup-
port Intention 1 as well, lest the two intentions remain equally resistant to 
judgment shift.  
Nor can the reasons for Intention 2 be too specific. We are seeking rea-
sons that are general enough that they always, or at least very often, apply to 
Intention 2. For if agents occasionally had strong enough independent rea-
sons to maintain their second-order intentions, Holtonian resolutions would 
succeed at resisting temptation only occasionally, and Holton’s account 
would remain in trouble. To attain the requisite generality, the reasons for 
Intention 2 should be independent of the particular content of Intention 1. 
One candidate for such a reason is the claim that an agent’s having an inten-
tion not to reconsider Intention 1 makes her maintaining Intention 1 more 
likely than if she did not have such a second-order intention. So long as the 
agent had a general reason to maintain her first-order intentions, she would 
have reason to form second-order intentions that bolster those first-order 
intentions. But this proposal is question-begging, for the candidate reason – 
that the presence of Intention 2 makes maintaining Intention 1 more likely – 
is precisely what is up for debate.  
Second, even if this proposal were not question-begging, it is not obvi-
ous that agents really do have broad reasons to maintain their first-order in-
tentions that are completely independent of the content of those intentions. 
In general, we have reason to be resolute in our particular intentions only to 
the extent that those intentions are good to have. Sometimes, particular reso-
lutions ought to be abandoned, as when new information comes to light that 
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entails that the resolution no longer makes sense. If agents had very a strong 
general reason to remain resolute independently of the content of their par-
ticular resolutions, they might not be sufficiently responsive to situational 
factors that override or undermine particular resolutions. We do not seem to 
have a strong candidate for a reason for Intention 2 that is narrow enough so 
as not always to support Intention 1 as well, but general enough to support 
Intention 2 across the board.  
If we cannot find general reasons that support Intention 2 but not In-
tention 1, perhaps we can bolster our second-order intentions by appealing 
to willpower. It is not entirely clear exactly how Holton takes the willpower 
mechanism to work. But suppose willpower functions as a source of friction 
or stickiness once a decision has been made and an intention formed: the 
resolute agent intends to Φ, intends not to reconsider this intention, and em-
ploys willpower to buckle down and follow through on each of these inten-
tions, even if buffeted by temptation or other barriers to action. Might will-
power enable an agent to resist reconsidering Intention 2, even when tempta-
tion presents a reason to reconsider it that is just as strong as the reason to 
reconsider Intention 1?  
Suppose that an agent who intends to Φ employs willpower to degree X 
to sustain her intention. If she is subject to a temptation-based reason of 
strength X+10 to reconsider this intention, her willpower may fail her. To 
prevent this, she can form a second-order intention and employ willpower to 
degree X to sustain that intention. If she is not faced with a similar reason of 
strength X+10 to reconsider, this second-order intention is likely to remain 
effective where the first-order intention failed. But what if temptation trans-
mits, and the agent is faced with a reason of strength X+10 to reconsider the 
second-order intention as well? Then the second-order intention is likely to 
fail as well. 
We have no good reason to suppose that an agent’s degree of willpower 
will as a rule be any greater at the second-order level than it is at the first-
order level. For both intentions are aimed at the same goal, and the degree of 
willpower the agent is willing and able to exert for any given intention is pre-
sumably a function of how important the goal is to her. If the amount of 
temptation-based pressure and the degree of willpower employed are the 
same at each level, then the Intention 2/Intention 1 pair will not be any more 
effective than Intention 1 alone would be. However, Temptation Transmission 
will remain forceful even if we grant that agents are occasionally able to in-
crease their second-order willpower, and are therefore on a case-by-case basis 
able to remain firm in their Holtonian resolutions. For this further source of 
resistance to judgment shift is neither systematic nor fully general. In the next 
section, I offer an account of resolutions that defuses Temptation Transmission 
entirely, rather than circumventing it on a case-by-case basis. 
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6. An Alternative Account of Resolutions 
 
If temptation cannot always and easily be blocked by a second-order inten-
tion, perhaps it can be blocked in another way. One strategy can be dismissed 
immediately. Adding a third-order intention to the resolution – an intention 
not to reconsider your second-order intention not to reconsider your first-
order intention not to Φ – will not suffice. This is because we can draw on 
RMRT and the anti-akrasia norm to apply Temptation Transmission mutatis mu-
tandis to a third-order intention, as well as to intentions of progressively 
higher orders. Nor do we want to give up on the plausible fundamental 
background principles that underlie Temptation Transmission.  
Rather, the Temptation Transmission argument shows us that we must ap-
peal to a mental state of a different sort to block temptation – specifically, to a 
mental state that is not subject to an anti-akrasia norm. Desires can success-
fully play this role: 
 
Second-Order Desire Account (SODA): Resolving to Φ involves intending to Φ, 
and desiring not to reconsider the intention to Φ.13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Earlier discussions of resolution or of strength of will make reference to second-order 
desires; however, SODA is distinct from each in important ways. Bigelow, Dodds and Par-
getter (1990) argue that temptation is best understood as a first-order desire to do X, and a 
second-order desire that the first-order desire to do X not be causally operative: “to be 
tempted is to have a desire which you want not to be your strongest desire” (44). In their 
account, strength of will consists in acting in line with the second-order desire, rather than 
the first. SODA proposes that an agent is resolute when she acts in accordance with a se-
cond-order desire, which at first glance appears to be a similar view. However, my account 
differs from theirs in two main ways. First, (with Holton) I construe temptation as the (ap-
pearance of a) reason to act, rather than as a pair of desires; this is because I believe that 
succumbing to temptation usually involves engaging in a sense-making process that involves 
responding to (apparent) reasons, rather than merely acting akratically. Second, the content 
of the second-order desire in SODA is an intention, rather than a first-order desire. The pres-
ence of the intention is essential, as the agent forms a second-order desire because she cares 
about being an effective agent, and carrying out her (general or specific) plans and goals (see 
the discussion of fetishism in Section 6.3 below). 
Kovach and Fitzpatrick (1999) argue that a necessary criterion for an account of reso-
lutions is the ability to accommodate both resolutions that aim at self-control and those that 
aim at self-transformation. They assess whether resolutions might be simple (or “narrow”) se-
cond-order desires, and argue that desires of this sort do not achieve self-control (because I 
might desire that I avoid donuts, and desire to have this desire, without actually avoiding 
donuts) or self-transformation (which requires that the desire “flow naturally and without 
conflict from values” (166)). They then assess whether resolutions might be second-order 
desires about the efficacy of a desire as Bigelow et al. propose: they argue that the proposal is 
on the right track, but needs to be supplemented. Kovach and Fitzpatrick offer a process-
specific desire account, according to which resolutions are second-order desires in which “the 
kinds of processes by which they are effected are included in their content” (167). These 
processes are those that “are constitutive of the projects of self-control and self-
transformation” (168). For example, an agent who aims at self-control might engage in a 
process of vividly imagining the negative consequences of giving in, or imagining the tempt-
ing thing as distasteful, or encouraging friends to chastise him if he fails; an agent who aims 
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SODA is meant to lay out necessary conditions on resolving to Φ, and 
does not purport to lay out a full set of sufficient conditions. According to 
SODA, an agent who resolves to Φ must at least intend to Φ, and must de-
sire that she carry out that intention, even in spite of contrary inclinations – 
she must care about whether she maintains her intention to Φ.14  
In the rest of this section, I explain why SODA is appealing as an alter-
native to Holon’s view. First, SODA does not fall prey to Temptation Transmis-
sion. Second, it can explain data about resolutions that intention-based views 
have a hard time accommodating. Finally, I address worries that Holton rais-
es about whether a view like SODA can adequately capture the phenome-
nology of making and keeping resolutions. 
 
6.1. Why SODA Avoids the Temptation Transmission Argument 
 
SODA will not fall prey to the same Temptation Transmission argument that 
troubles Holton’s view. For the argument to be effective against SODA, we 
would need to employ an analogue of Claim 3 that was about desire rather 
than intention: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
at self-transformation might attempt to consciously change her self-conception. 
Kovach and Fitzpatrick’s account differs from SODA in that the content of the se-
cond-order desire that makes up the resolution is (1) a desire, rather than an intention, and 
(2) necessarily about specific processes having to do with engaging in self-control or self-
transformation. I have already addressed why the content of the second-order desire must be 
an intention rather than a desire. I find the process component of their account overly re-
strictive. While resolutions generally do aim at self-control or self-transformation, I do not 
think that the processes by which these aims are attained must be part of the object of the 
desire. If I intend to avoid donuts and desire that this intention be effective, I have success-
fully resolved to avoid donuts – even if I do not have any desires about the particular pro-
cesses that I will engage in to make this intention effective. 
14 One might worry that this proposal is implausible if we can always form resolutions at will, 
since we cannot form desires at will and resolutions require desires. However, I do not think 
we can form resolutions at will when we lack the necessary desires. For example, imagine 
that you do not care at all about whether your intention to avoid smoking remains intact. 
That is, you intend to quit smoking, but could not care less about whether you maintain or 
abandon this intention. How could you form a resolution in such a case? It seems plausible 
that an agent who lacks all desire to remain consistent in her intention to Φ will be unable to 
genuinely resolve to Φ.  
In the majority of cases, an agent who attempts to form a resolution to Φ will desire to 
maintain the intention to Φ, for she would not be attempting to form a resolution about 
Φing in the first place if she did not have such a desire. Cases in which an agent attempts to 
form a resolution but cannot do so because she lacks the requisite desire may be possible; 
perhaps an agent suffering from depression intends to Φ and aims to turn this intention into 
a resolution, but cannot bring herself to care about whether the intention is effective. But we 
do not expect agents in such situations to be able to successfully form resolutions. Nor are 
such cases common in typical agents. 
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Claim 3*: Reconsidering any desire to avoid reconsidering the intention not to Φ is 
necessary for rationally reconsidering the intention not to Φ. 
 
If Claim 3* were true, we could use RMRT to argue that the appearance of a 
reason to reconsider the intention not to Φ necessarily leads to the appear-
ance of a reason to reconsider your desire not to engage in such reconsidera-
tion. But Claim 3* is not true, because desires are not subject to the same 
rational norms forbidding akrasia that intentions are subject to. 
It is not necessarily irrational to desire that you Φ while nevertheless fail-
ing to Φ, or to desire that you refrain from Φing while Φing anyway. We all 
have very many desires that we do not act on, and we display no irrationality 
in doing so. I can desire to spend the day at the beach and rationally fail to 
do so because I have to spend the day at work instead. Similarly, I might de-
sire to avoid an unpleasant task such as filing my taxes, but I display no irra-
tionality in filing them anyway. It can be rational to do what you desire not to 
do in a way that it is not rational to do what you intend not to do. Structurally 
speaking, making the move from second-order intention to second-order 
desire is exactly what we need to avoid Temptation Transmission. This is be-
cause the argument’s success depends on the existence of a second-order in-
tention that is subject to an anti-akrasia norm requiring the agent to avoid the 
state of intending to Φ while not Φing. If we replace this intention with a 
mental state like desire that is not subject to the same anti-akrasia norm, we 
cannot generate the same argument. 
 
6.2. How SODA Explains Variations in the Strength of Resolutions 
 
Resolutions come in degrees; some resolutions are stronger than others. A 
resolution is stronger to the extent that an agent takes it more seriously, and a 
greater excuse is needed to license breaking it. My resolution to read Don 
Quixote is not very strong because this is a nice but inessential goal, whereas 
my resolution to pursue my research project is very strong because this is an 
important part of my career plan. Appealing to desire as a necessary compo-
nent of a resolution gives us an easy and efficient explanation of how resolu-
tions can vary in strength. For desires clearly come in degrees; some desires 
are stronger than others. We can explain the strength of a resolution as a di-
rect result of the strength of the agent’s desire to avoid reconsideration: the 
stronger the desire, the stronger the resolution. Since intentions do not come 
in fine-grained degrees, Holton’s intention-based account cannot offer the 
same sort of explanation.15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In chapter 2 of Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Holton outlines a notion of “partial intention.” 
This is not a fine-grained strength or degree of intention in the way that there are fine-
grained strengths of desire. Rather, “an intention to F is partial iff it is designed to achieve a 
given end E and it is accompanied by one or more alternative intentions also designed to 
achieve E” (36). 
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Explaining the strength of resolutions in terms of the strength of the 
agent’s desire to avoid reconsideration makes intuitive sense as well. In gen-
eral, the degree to which an agent is resolute in Φing seems to depend not on 
how strong the temptation to Φ is, but on how much the agent cares about 
whether she Φs. Suppose I resolve not to drink any beer at a party tonight, 
but I really do not care very much about whether I keep this resolution. Even 
beer that is not very tempting (say, mass-produced American lager) will be 
likely to sway me to break my resolution. But suppose I resolve not to drink 
any beer at a party tonight, and I care very much about whether I keep this 
resolution. In such a case, it seems that even extremely tempting beer (say, an 
unusual, local, craft IPA) will not be very likely to sway me to break my reso-
lution. What explains the difference between these two cases is that the reso-
lution is stronger in the second case, when my desire to avoid reconsidera-
tion is stronger.  
This variation in strength of desires gives SODA another explanatory 
advantage over Holton’s view. One might be worried that temptation puts 
pressure on an agent’s resolution not just by making it appear that there is a 
reason to reconsider her resolute intention, but also by creating a desire in her 
to reconsider this intention. After all, desire aims at the good, and the tempt-
ing thing presents itself as good. SODA can explain when resolutions are 
able to resist desire-based temptations of this sort. If temptation ever works 
in this way, agents are faced with conflicting desires: a temptation-based de-
sire to reconsider, and a resolution-based desire not to reconsider. Resolu-
tions sometimes fail; neither Holton nor I want to claim that our respective 
accounts of resolutions enable agents to resist in every instance. According to 
SODA, whether a given resolution is effective when faced with a conflicting 
temptation-based desire will depend in part on how strong the resolution-
based desire is, and whether it is strong enough to outweigh the temptation-
based desire. It would not be as easy and straightforward to weigh the 
strength of a second-order intention against that of the temptation-based de-
sire. 
 
6.3. Why SODA Can Capture the Phenomenology of Resolutions 
 
SODA is a natural option to consider once the possibility of a second-order 
account of resolutions has been raised. Indeed, in Willing, Wanting, Waiting, 
Holton considers and rejects a simple version of a higher-order desire ac-
count. Does Holton’s rejection of higher-order desire views bring to light 
problems of comparable gravity for SODA as the efficacy objection creates 
for Holton’s view? Holton considers the following higher-order desire view: 
suppose you resolve to Φ and “you have a strong desire to be resolute: a strong 
desire to stick to your resolutions” (116). He grants that this could enable the 
agent to resist temptation, for “when the date for implementing the resolu-
tions comes, provided that your desire to be resolute is stronger than your 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 10, NO. 2 
RECONSIDERING RESOLUTIONS 
Alida Liberman 
	   22 
desire to [give up], you have a desire-driven way to give up” (116). Holton 
calls this the further desire approach, presenting a problem for it in a footnote: 
 
The further desire approach seems to involve attributing to the strong-willed agent a 
desire for resoluteness that approaches a fetish. It is surely crazy to want to be reso-
lute for its own sake, especially if, as a result of judgement shift, the agent comes to 
believe that the resolute course of action is the less desirable (118). 
 
First, I’m not convinced that a desire for resoluteness is in fact as fetishistic 
as Holton makes it out to be. An agent who desires resoluteness need not 
care about resoluteness simpliciter, but might instead care about effectively carry-
ing out all of her endorsed plans; being resolute helps her to carry out these plans. 
Fetishistic desires are those that you hold on to for no good reason, or even 
in spite of reasons to the contrary – but in general, we have good reason to 
be effective planning agents regarding our own endorsed plans, and to have 
resolute dispositions that help us attain this goal. 
Second, suppose Holton is right that desires to be resolute are problem-
atically fetishistic. SODA need not require that agents desire to be resolute in 
general. Rather, they could desire to be resolute with regard to specific inten-
tions, which we can assume they take themselves to have independent rea-
sons to act on. Such desires would not be fetishistic, because agents would 
have independent reasons to maintain them. 
One might worry that second-order desires about specific intentions 
would not be very effective, because they are not distinct enough from first-
order desires for the objects of those intentions.16 So an agent might desire 
that her intention not to eat the donut be effective because she desires to eat 
the donut. But if this desire not to eat the donut persists throughout the 
temptation, it is not clear that the resolution needs to do any extra work. And 
if the desire not to eat the donut does not persist, why should we expect the 
desire to remain resolute in the intention not to eat the donut to persist?  
Neither of these possibilities is a problem for SODA. First, if the agent’s 
first-order desire to refrain from eating the donut persists throughout the 
temptation, then no resolution is needed, and so it does not matter whether 
the resolution does any extra work. A first-order desire to Φ can motivate 
you to carry out an intention to Φ. You need to resolve to Φ if you are not 
sure whether this first-order desire will remain strong in the face of tempta-
tion. If the first-order desire does remain firm, it can do the motivational 
work in bringing you to carry out the intention. But if the first-order desire 
lessens or disappears, the second-order desire can do the motivational work 
instead. 
Second, the second-order desire can persist when the first-order desire 
does not because the second-order desire is held for additional reasons. I 
might desire to avoid eating a donut because I do not want to ruin my sup-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry. 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 10, NO. 2 
RECONSIDERING RESOLUTIONS 
Alida Liberman 
	   23 
per, or because I do not want to get powdered sugar on my shirt, or because 
I want to heed my doctor’s advice to consume less sugar, etc. I desire to re-
main firm in my intention to avoid eating donuts for another reason: because 
I care about carrying out my donut-avoidance plan and being an effective 
agent regarding the baked goods I consume. Granted, I care about carrying 
out my donut-avoidance plan because I am concerned with heeding my doc-
tor’s advice, etc. But my desire to carry out my plan is a desire about what 
kind of agent I want to be; this sort of desire is resistant to temptations that 
press on the content of the plan itself. 
A more serious problem Holton finds with the further-desire approach 
is that it “completely misrepresents the phenomenology of strength of will” 
(118): 
 
If these accounts were right, then sticking to a resolution would consist in the tri-
umph of one desire (the stronger) over another. But that isn’t what it feels like. It 
typically feels as though there is a struggle. One maintains one’s resolutions by dint 
of effort in the face of the contrary desire … by and large, maintaining strength of 
will requires effort (118). 
 
There is an important insight here. Sticking to a resolution in the face of 
temptation indeed feels like a struggle, and maintaining strength of will re-
quires effort. But rather than lead us to dismiss SODA completely, this worry 
should help us realize that desire-based accounts of resolutions need to be 
more nuanced than they might first appear. 
An account like SODA need not be committed to a simple Humean pic-
ture in which desires do all of the motivating work and the agent is simply 
along for the ride, at the mercy of whichever desire is strongest. For SODA 
does not claim that a second-order desire is by itself sufficient to bring an agent 
to act resolutely. Rather, it claims only that the second-order desire is neces-
sary. This is entirely compatible with it being the case that serious mental ef-
fort on the part of the agent is also necessary for resolute action. Even a dis-
tinct faculty of willpower of the kind Holton describes is compatible with 
SODA, so long as desire plays an essential role in triggering the agent to em-
ploy that willpower. 
Holton grants that this is often the case. In a discussion about willpow-
er, he notes that whether an agent revises a resolution “will depend on, 
amongst other things, the strength of their desire to maintain those resolu-
tions in particular, and the strength of their desire to maintain their resolute-
ness in general” (133). He also notes that “to be effective, these desires need 
not be the strongest. If the agent’s willpower is sufficiently strong, a weak 
desire to be resolute might be all that is needed to keep it in place when it 
wavers in the face of a strong contrary desire” stemming from temptation 
(133).  
SODA does not require that the desire to be resolute is the strongest de-
sire that the agent has, capable of overwhelming all of her other desires. Only 
one claim about desire is essential for SODA: that the desire present in reso-
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lutions is not subject to the anti-akrasia norm that drives Temptation Transmis-
sion. Any account of desire that meets this constraint can block the transmis-
sion of temptation. Since intentions of any order are subject to anti-akrasia 
norms, they cannot block the transmission of temptation all by themselves. 
Something more is needed; I have suggested that something is desire. 
The primary point of disagreement between Holton’s view and SODA is 
not about whether desire can play a role in helping agents to remain resolute; 
Holton grants that it can. Rather, SODA and Holton’s view differ over the 
role played by second-order intentions. Holton claims that they are both nec-
essary and sufficient for maintaining resolutions. I have argued that they are 
insufficient because they leave resolutions vulnerable to the efficacy objec-
tion. By more thoroughly developing this objection, we have not only seen 
why temptation transmits in such a way that Holton’s view does not succeed. 
We have also fleshed out the previously under-explained mechanism by 
which agents succumb to temptation, and discovered that what is needed to 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Thanks to Joshua Crabill, Steve Finlay, Ben Lennertz, Hanti Lin, Shyam Nair, Jake Ross, 
Mark Schroeder, Julia Staffel, Gary Watson, two anonymous referees and the audience at the 
2014 Annual Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy for valuable comments on and 
discussion of this paper. 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 10, NO. 2 
RECONSIDERING RESOLUTIONS 
Alida Liberman 
	   25 
References 
 
Bedke, M. S. (2009) “The Iffiest Oughts: A Guise of Reasons Account of End-Given Condi-
tionals,” Ethics 119(4): 672-98. 
Bigelow, J., Dodds, S. M. and Pargetter, R. (1990) “Temptation and the Will,” American Philo-
sophical Quarterly 27(1): 39-49. 
Bratman, M. (2009a) “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,” in E. S. Robertson, ed., 
Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 29-61. 
____ (2009b) “Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self Governance,” Ethics 119(3): 411-43. 
____ (1987) Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Broome, J. (2013) Rationality Through Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Carr, J. (2016) “Don’t Stop Believing,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(5-6): 744-66. 
Christensen, D. (2000) “Diachronic Coherence Versus Epistemic Impartiality,” Philosophical 
Review 109: 349-71. 
Cohen, D. and Handfield, T. (2010) “Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will,” 
Mind 119(476): 907-32. 
Dannenberg, J. (2015) “Promising Ourselves, Promising Others,” The Journal of Ethics 19(2): 
159-83.  
Darwall, S. (1983) Impartial Reason, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Ferrero, L. (2012) “Diachronic Constraints of Practical Rationality,” Philosophical Issues 22(1): 
144-64. 
Gauthier, D. (1997) “Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation: A Critique and a Defense,” 
Noûs 31(1): 1-25. 
Goble, L. (2004) “A Proposal for Dealing with Deontic Dilemmas,” Deontic Logic in Computer 
Science: 74-113. 
Habib, A. (2009) “Promises to the Self,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39(4): 537-57.  
Hedden, B. (2015) Reasons Without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Hills, A. (2003) “Duties and Duties to the Self,” American Philosophical Quarterly 40: 131-42. 
Hlobil, U. (2015) “There Are Diachronic Norms of Rationality,” Thought: A Journal of Philoso-
phy 4(1): 38-45. 
Holton, R. (2009) Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Horty, J. (1993) “Deontic Logic as Founded on Nonmonotonic Logic,” Annals of Mathematics 
and Artificial Intelligence 9: 69-91. 
Kolodny, N. (forthcoming) “Instrumental Reasons,” in D. Star, ed., The Oxford Handbook of 
Reasons and Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
____ (2007) “How Does Coherence Matter?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107(1.3): 
229-63. 
Kovach, V. and Fiztpatrick, J. (1999) “Resolutions,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77(2): 
161-73. 
Liberman, A. (unpublished manuscript) “Understanding Vows.” 
Maier, J. (2010) “Review of Willing, Wanting, Waiting,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(2): 
361-64. 
McClennen, E. F. (1990) Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
McGuire, M. C. (1961) “Decisions, Resolutions, and Moral Conduct,” Philosophical Quarterly, 
11(42): 61-67. 
Mele, A. (1987) Irrationality:	  An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Moss, S. (2015) “Time-Slice Epistemology and Action under Indeterminacy,” in J. Haw-
thorne and T. Gendler, eds., Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 5, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, pp. 172-94. 
Nagel, T. (1970) The Possibility of Altruism, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 10, NO. 2 
RECONSIDERING RESOLUTIONS 
Alida Liberman 
	   26 
Nair, S. (2014) “Consequences of Reasoning with Conflicting Obligations,” Mind 123(491): 
753-90. 
Paul, S. (2011) “Review of Willing, Wanting, Waiting,” Mind 120(479): 889-92. 
Raz, J. (2005) “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1: 
1-28. 
____ (1977) “Promises and Obligations,” in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz, eds., Law, Morality 
and Society: Essays in Honor of H. L. A. Hart, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 210-28. 
Rorty, A. (1980) “Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place?” Australasian Journal of Philoso-
phy 58: 333-46. 
Rosati, C. (2011) “The Importance of Self-Promises,” in H. Sheinman, ed., Promises and 
Agreements, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Scanlon, T. M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Schroeder, M. (2009) “Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons,” Philo-
sophical Studies 143(2): 223-48. 
Singer, M. (1959) “On Duties to Oneself,” Ethics 69(3): 202-5. 
Tappolet, C. (2013) “Weakness of Will,” in H. LaFolette, ed., The International Encyclopedia of 
Ethics, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Way, J. (2012) “Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason,” Ethics 122(3): 489-515. 
 ____ (2010) “Defending the Wide Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason,” Philosophical 
Studies 147(2): 213-33. 
Wiggins, D. (1987) “Weakness of Will, Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation 
and Desire,” in Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Values, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, pp. 239-67. 
 
